Unlike in Nandigram before the police firing of March 2007, the violence against the CPI(M) and the common cause of the Maoists, TC and Congress in Lalgarh are being openly reported in the media. So it will be difficult to pin the blame entirely on the Left Front government.
But it appears improbable that administrative or police action will solve this issue at Lalgarh, the likely outcome can be a permanent problem. Even if the police smash their way into Lalgarh, it will be difficult to "hold", until the insurrectionary conditions subside. That was exactly the case with Nandigram. Moreover, more violence will lead to the killing of more poor people. The CPI(M) and the Left Front government have wanted to fight this battle politically, so that the popular support can be won back, but now that option increasingly seems difficult.
The situation CPI(M) finds itself in is quite odd. It is being attacked from the left, right and center, when just a couple of years back it appeared to have wide popularity. The change has been so drastic that the initial reaction was to avoid; then to discard and dismiss, then deny, and now a state of shock, as if check-mated. Even the TC poll plank has been more leftwing than the CPI(M) in the recent elections rooted to its slogan against corporate industrialization and neoliberal paradigm of development. It appears that people in Bengal wanted a change from the "tyranny" of the apathetic state administration and arrogance of the local CPI(M) leaders. They saw the poor affiliated to CPI(M) gaining, while others remained uncared, class outlook of the government work gradually got converted into party outlook. Congress state governments provided rice at Rs. 2 a kg for the poor and got support. People do not think of world history of decades and centuries while voting, they want immediate relief through their vote. They voted for immediate relief of rural employment guarantee, of Rs. 2 a kg rice for the poor, also immediate relief from the party-Govt "tyranny" here. Interestingly the CPI(M) declared "immediate relief" as its stated objective for state governments way back in 1964.
And after 32 years of left rule in Bengal people distinguish between their friends and enemies and vote against this very party. It indeed is an irony!
With the limited resources at its disposal, the Left Front government worked to improve the lives and livelihoods of the poorest and empower them through democracy and decentralisation. From the class angle, whereas the benefits should have reached all and any poor, in practice it reached those with the CPIM first. A division emerged between those with the CPI(M) and the larger public. This division was sharpened through neglect on part of the CPI(M) and by mass movements organized by the anti-CPI(M) bloc. Therefore, CPI(M) worker Anuj Pandey's palatial house in poverty ridden Lalgarh could become such an easy target for the Maoist-backed movement. The CPI(M) cadres are perceived as representing state authority, as beneficiaries of the system, an empowered class of people.
Factionalism inside the CPI(M) helped such "leaders" entrench themselves, while democratic centralism was used as a tool inside the party to dismiss any dissent or critique as questioning the so called party line. As a result today CPI(M) leaders find themselves isolated from the masses and popular agitations can easily be built against them. With the CPI(M) entrenched in power, it attracted those who wanted to use government levers for gain. The number who joined out of political or ideological commitment continually reduced, specially given the lack of mass movements. This demoralised and demobilised communists inside the CPI(M) and allowed careerists to take an upper hand. Now, even CPI(M)'s sitting members of parliament and legislative assembly join the TC, Congress and even the BJP. The rot spread aster as the political strategy of "people's democratic revolution" was buried under the tactical slogan of defending the Left Front government. Eventually, government agendas became party agendas and administrative exigencies started defining politics.
At present police action has started in Lalgarh and initial reports are that there has not been any armed resistance met by them. But these are early days yet. The very fact that police and paramilitary forces have to be sent, each house searched and the entire area put under some sort of armed police control indicates the fatal loss for politics. Even if we assume that the Maoists control of Lalgarh will be broken without loss of life, police stations opened and civil administration restored, it does not imply a political victory. What needs to be recognised is that Lalgarh witnessed something of an insurrection. This insurrection was caused by felt police highhandedness and the loss of faith among large numbers of local people in the CPI(M) and the Bengal government. Wrong politics, not only in Lalgarh, has brought us to this impasse which can only be broken by armed police action. Pointing to the culpability of the Maoists, TC or Congress for encouraging sections of the local people to take up arms and kill CPI(M) workers is necessary but not enough. Neither poverty nor grievances with the civil administration are new in Lalgarh, but till recently these very adivasis felt a sense of affiliation with the CPI(M) in dealing with these. Today they seem to have turned their back to this party. To blame the people for this would either be naivety of the highest order or simply gross arrogance.
Unless a politics based on the demands of the poor and a radical transformation of power relations is foregrounded, unless careerists are pruned, unless there is a drastic course correction by the CPI(M), things might not improve, either at Lalgarh, Nandigram, Singur, or Darjeeling, or, for that matter, in the CPI(M)'s election prospects.
References.
Dzedong, Mao (1967):
Problems of War and Strategy (Peking, Foreign Languages Press).